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IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF EUROPEAN 
ACQUISITIONS 
 
Rekha Rao Nicholson 
Julie Salaber 
 
This study looks at the impact of the recent financial crisis on the short-term performance of 
European acquisitions. We use institutional theory and transaction cost economic theory to 
study whether bidders derive lower or higher returns from acquisitions announced after 
2008. We investigate shareholders’ stock price reaction to 2245 deals which occurred during 
2004–12 across 22 European Union countries. Our results from both univariate and 
multivariate analysis show that the deals announced in the post-crisis period, corresponding 
to the period of economic recession, generate higher returns to shareholders as compared 
to acquisitions announced in the pre-crisis period. We also test the relevance of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), that is, the Eurozone, to this value accrual during the 
recessionary period. We observe that non-EMU transactions obtain significantly higher gains 
vis-à-vis EMU transactions in the post-crisis years. Overall, announcement returns of 
European acquisitions have been affected by the financial crisis and the global recession; 
and companies that target countries with different currency regimes are likely to generate 
better returns from their acquisitions. 
 
Keywords: Financial crisis, European Union, Acquisitions, Short-term performance, 
Eurozone 
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Shareholder wealth accretion is difficult to predict under most circumstances (Doukas and 
Kan, 2006, Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006) and it can become a herculean task when 
cast under the shadows of a financial crisis (Mody and Negishi, 2000). In this chapter, we 
examine the under-explored effects of macroeconomic environment, that is the role of a 
supra-national institution like the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), on the value 
creation ability of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for investors during the financial turmoil. 
We look at European acquisitions undertaken before and after the 2007–08 financial crisis to 
ascertain short-term shareholder returns. The majority of earlier studies either looked at 
domestic versus international aspects of M&A deals without paying attention to the regional 
and supra-national arrangements integrating different countries, or they have examined the 
performance of M&A deals during ‘normal’ times which leaves out the effects of financial 
instability/economic recession within and across a political/economic union as a question yet 
to be answered.   
In this study, we look at acquisitions across 22 European Union (EU) countries (both EMU 
and non-EMU) and expect countries within the EMU to experience similar institutional 
constraints from the economic slowdown (Rose and Spiegel, 2012).  
As this chapter concentrates on the impact of the recent financial crisis on the short-term 
performance of European acquisitions, we hypothesize and test the following research 
questions: Did the financial crisis impact shareholder returns of European acquisitions? 
Does the EMU have an influence over the deals undertaken after the financial crisis? We 
use institutional theory and transaction cost economic theory to study whether bidders derive 
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lower or higher returns from acquisitions announced after 2008. We investigate 
shareholders’ stock price reaction to 2245 deals which occurred during 2004–12 across 22 
EU countries. 
By investigating the performance of European cross-border mergers and acquisitions before 
and after the financial crisis, our study fills a gap in the literature and links two interesting 
and equally important topics: cross-border M&A activity and performance within an economic 
union (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006) and the impact of a crisis on business 
performance (Chau et al., 2012). Our study extends the argument on how a crisis will impact 
short-term returns on companies’ inorganic growth strategy through mergers and 
acquisitions. 
 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES  
 
The European region has a Single European Market since 1992 (the European Union and its 
28 member countries); and in 1999, the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
was begun. The EMU gathers 17 countries with a common monetary policy supervised by 
the European Central Bank. The theoretical arguments which support links between trade 
liberalization, regional trade agreements and acquisitions have been discussed in 
Coeurdacier et al. (2009). In economic growth times, a monetary union will foster easy 
access to goods across national borders and help low-cost firms to buy high-cost firms 
effortlessly. Also, the integration of financial systems brought about by a monetary union will 
sustain the flow of equity capital between different countries. Such European integration 
should drive down the cost of conducting transactions within its borders. Also, due to the 
elimination of financial barriers within the Eurozone and the implementation of a single 
currency, home bias has greatly decreased within the euro area (Issing, 2006). The EMU 
has helped the manufacturing sector restructure its capital (Coeurdacier et al., 2009). It also 
reduces business stealing effect (Bjorvatn, 2004), thus, making it attractive for companies to 
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engage in cross-border deals within the EMU. European economic integration reduces the 
reservation price of the target (Bjorvatn, 2004). Since the run up to 1992, the EMU element 
of foreign direct investment in Europe, including acquisitions, has grown considerably 
(Chesnais and Simonetti, 2000). European firms have used M&As as a tool to build and 
develop intra-European networks (Ietto-Gillies et al., 2000). Over the last few decades, there 
has been a consolidation of stock exchanges which indeniably helped easing M&A 
transactions within the EU and beyond. For instance, OMX Group and Euronext Group are 
the merging of stock exchanges of various European countries.  
Hence, looking at this natural setting where both domestic and cross-border deals within the 
EMU are likely to achieve equal returns to acquirers is an appealing area of research. Extant 
research on the short-term performance of bidders shows that, on average, acquirers earn 
negative abnormal returns (Kim et al., 2011, Klossek et al., 2012, Kobrin, 1979). The short-
term performance outcomes of cross-border acquisitions are mixed. US bidders acquiring in 
foreign locales can experience positive (Doukas and Travlos, 1988, Kostova et al., 2008) or 
negative (Ghemawat, 2001) returns. A study on UK cross-border bidders shows that they do 
not earn any significant abnormal return around the announcement date (Gregory and 
McCorriston, 2005).   
The United States was in financial crisis from December 2007 (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) 
which was followed by the Eurozone debt crisis (Arezki et al., 2011). The global M&A activity 
peaked in 2007 (UNCTAD, 2011); however, when the effects of the crisis were realized, the 
world’s foreign direct investment amount, including acquisitions, fell from $1979 billion to 
$1697 billion in 2008 and the trend continued in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2009). Profit reduction and 
shrinking operational overheads have compelled businesses to focus their resources on their 
main business and not diverge into other industries or countries. Also, stock markets have 
lost much of their value (Te Velde et al., 2009), thus, limiting the value of transactions 
(UNCTAD, 2009). Yet, we observe many firms undertaking acquisitions. This is consistent 
with neoclassical theory suggesting that the occurrence of M&As is a consequence of 
economic shocks (Harford, 2005, Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). Hence, it is pertinent to 
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scrutinize how these domestic and cross-border deals have fared after the global financial 
crisis. 
The phenomenon of acquisitions and associated shareholder wealth accrual has been 
extensively researched (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006, Schoenberg, 2006). Studies 
have ranged from country (Eckert et al., 2010) and regional studies (Campa and Hernando, 
2006) to those that address outcomes of these activities globally (Doukas and Kan, 2006). 
Comparative studies have looked at the returns of domestic versus cross-border acquisitions 
(Anand et al., 2005, Gubbi et al., 2010). In spite of all this, though studies have looked at 
acquisitions during other crises (Mody and Negishi, 2000, Williams and Nguyen, 2005), there 
is limited research on acquisitions during the recent financial crisis and the following 
economic recession. Similarly, there are limited studies on supranational institutions and 
their influence on regional M&As.  
We argue that our understanding of outcomes of acquisitions during a crisis can be 
enhanced by using multiple theoretical lenses to decipher the influence of the recent crisis 
on intra-European acquisitions.  
Differential value accrual in acquisitions before and after the financial crisis 
During the economic slowdown, resource redeployment for maximizing opportunity 
landscape for firm’s survival is imperative. Acquisitions provide this opportunity to 
reconfigure product-mix (Krishnan et al., 2004). Similarly, resources are scarce during 
recessionary times, and acquisitions undergone after the financial crisis, akin to periods of 
evironmental jolts described by other authors, can be seen as a way to change firms’ 
resources and capabilities (Wan and Yiu, 2009, Karim and Mitchell, 2000). These 
acquisitions would help companies to better adjust to the dynamic nature of business 
environment in the post-crisis period. To understand the value generated in acquisitions 
during the post-crisis period, it might be fruitful to look at the effect of the crisis on 
transaction costs between the acquiring and target firms. The use of transaction cost 
economics to explain costs involved in acquisitions derives its intellectual roots from the 
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work of Williamson (1975). The argument developed from this theory centers around 
numerous imperfections that may be present in markets for intangible resources, including 
immobility, information asymmetries and related moral hazards, causal ambiguity, and 
monopoly. Williamson’s seminal work also looks at the cost of conducting exchanges under 
various institutional circumstances that allow for protection of relationship-specific 
investments at the lowest total cost. Transaction cost economics also relates to secondary 
cost of negotiation and enforcement.  
In the pre-crisis period, shareholder returns to European M&As, both EMU and non-EMU, 
will be similar to returns widely discussed in extant literature. Also, in the pre-crisis period, 
the monetary union will lower the cost of transaction across borders and facilitate high-cost 
firms to be bought by low-cost firms (Coeurdacier et al., 2009). The financial integration 
within Europe will help in the reduction of the cost of capital, the removal of exchange rate 
risk, the creation of shared common trading platforms and the integration in post-trading 
market infrastructure (Coeurdacier et al., 2009).  
In the post-crisis period, both EMU and non-EMU targets might face further devaluation in 
their immediate business environment (Pangarkar and Lie, 2004) and might experience 
erosion of firm value due to crisis-related economic distress (Wruck, 1990, Acharya and 
Schnabl, 2010, Mitton, 2002). During the financial crisis, companies are looking to quickly 
restructure and realign their assets (Campello et al., 2010) reducing the time spent on 
negotiations prior to acquisitions. Similarly, it can be argued that after the crisis, due to firm 
devaluation and stock market crash, overpayment for acquisitions is highly unlikely (Wan 
and Yiu, 2009), thus reducing the cost of individual transactions. Also, transaction costs are 
reduced by leveraging of internal capital markets by slack-rich firms who can acquire slack-
poor firms with extraordinary growth opportunities (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). 
Companies can generate synergies during turbulent economic times by adopting new 
resources and using new opportunities through acquisitions at low costs (Chattopadhyay et 
al., 2001, Meyer, 1982). We argue that in Europe the 2007–08 crisis will lend its affect on 
firm transactions and in deciding values gained by shareholders. Thus we expect that 
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European companies benefit from the global recession when undertaking acquisitions 
activites, that is, shareholders give more value to acquisitions announced after the financial 
crisis due to higher risks and returns associated with undertaking acquisitions during bad 
economic times.  
Hypothesis 1: European companies that announce acquisitions in the post-crisis period will 
achieve higher returns as compared to companies that announce acquisitions in the pre-
crisis period.  
Returns to EMU vis-à-vis non-EMU transactions 
Institutional theorists like North (1990) have explored the role and effect of institutions on 
certainty in business transactions. Both formal and informal institutions introduce constraints 
that businesses need to understand and apply to engage in their day-to-day activities. Most 
of these institutions, formal and informal, are nation-specific and it is pertinent for companies 
to comprehend these rules of game to engage in economic activity across national borders. 
Similarly, countries that have similar institutions, including financial institutions, are likely to 
have companies with similar corporate structure and provide business environment that 
foster international acquisitions (Gubbi et al., 2010).  
In the pre-crisis period, the EMU will help reducing the cost of capital, removing exchange 
rate risk, creating common trading platforms and integrating post-trading market 
infrastructure (Coeurdacier et al., 2009). The financial integration can also help restructuring 
several economic sectors such as the manufacturing sector (Coeurdacier et al., 2009). This 
will generate considerable traction for intra-EMU acquisitions. Thus, in terms of 
internationalization within Europe, non-Eurozone countries will encounter greater institutional 
dissimilarities. The environmental complexity is minimized when companies engage with 
host countries that have institutions comparable to their home country (Dikova et al., 2009). 
Acquirers are able to understand and adjust easily to business environments that are similar 
to their own (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Thus, in good economic times, being part of this 
exclusive club might prove to be an advantage for some companies internationalizing within 
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Europe. Hence, in the pre-crisis period, transactions happening within the EMU are likely to 
derive higher returns than non-EMU transactions. 
The economic recession spreading across Europe as a result of the 2007–08 financial crisis 
adds a fresh dynamics to the above story. The new financial and corporate assets made 
accessible through international acquisitions can be particularly useful following a systemic 
crisis that affects a large number of firms (Mody and Negishi, 2000). Too much similarity, as 
evidenced within EMU countries, might leave little space to harness cross-border differences 
and nuances that help businesses leverage their competitive advantages, especially in a 
recessionary economic landscape (Wan and Yiu, 2009, Gubbi et al., 2010). Indeed some 
European countries have different currencies and financial institutions as they are outside 
the EMU. Authors have indicated that differential tax systems can help cross-border deals 
(Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Thus we argue that, within Europe, the distinction 
between EMU and non-EMU transactions is more relevant than the usual distinction 
between domestic and cross-border transactions. This non-EMU effect is likely to be 
amplified during bad economic times as firms are looking to find suitable partners to 
leverage their synergies (Mody and Negishi, 2000, Wan and Yiu, 2009). Thus, in this 
turbulent business climate, shareholder’s returns are driven by what the market perceives as 
optimal coupling during acquisitions. In the years after 2008, the acquirer and target 
differences in terms of financial institutions and implied differences in institutional stability 
and access to finance can create a new mix of competencies and resources which can be 
suitable for adapting to new market conditions. Authors have looked at other high turbulent 
business environments, such as privatizations in transition economies, and argued that 
understanding country risk is essential to foreign acquisitions as it can fundamentally alter 
the basis upon which acquisition decisions are made (Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 2000). 
During the post-crisis period, we argue that financial contagion and associated economic, 
political and financial risk will have much larger impact on firm’s strategic decision to acquire 
within the EMU or outside. We argue there are several dynamics within this region which 
could drive acquisitions and returns to transactions. For example, countries outside the EMU 
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might be shielded from the immediate impact of emergent financial and economic turbulence 
from, say, the collapse of the common currency. Hence, for countries within the EMU, buying 
outside the Eurozone might signify risk diversification. Indeed, companies that choose to 
transact outside the EMU are creating a valuable service for investors by permitting them to 
diversify their portfolio risk indirectly by purchasing shares in multinationals outside the 
immediate impact region. Also, a non-EMU company buying an EMU firm could indicate risk 
diversification. Thus, we argue that stock markets will accordingly reward these non-EMU 
transactions as compared to intra-EMU deals.  
Hypothesis 2: In the post-crisis period, European companies that engage in non-EMU deals 
derive better returns as compared to firms that engage in EMU deals. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA  
 
Event study methodology 
We use an event study methodology to assess the effect of the financial crisis and following 
recession on the short-term performance of European acquirers. This event study method 
measures and tests for the significance of abnormal stock returns around the acquisition’s 
announcement date (MacKinlay, 1997). Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference 
between actual ex post and expected normal returns: 
)|( ti ti ti t XRERAR           (1) 
where ARit, Rit, and E(Rit | Xt) are the abnormal, actual and expected returns respectively at 
time t and Xt is the conditioning set of information in the normal return model. The abnormal 
return thus measures the stock market response to the announcement of an acquisition as 
visible in the movement of share prices of the acquiring firm. This method is similar to extant 
literature focusing on the short-term performance of mergers and acquisitions (Cartwright 
and Schoenberg, 2006, Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005, Gubbi et al., 2010, Doukas and 
Kan, 2006). Also, this ex ante performance measure prior to the actual integration of the 
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target has been demonstrated to link well with ex post firm-level outcomes (Kale et al., 2002, 
Pangarkar and Lie, 2004). 
We then calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each deal by summing daily 
abnormal returns over the event window [-5;0]: 



0
5t
i ti ARCAR .          (2) 
Multivariate methodology 
In order to test our hypotheses, we run a cross-sectional analysis whereby we try to explain 
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) with alternative independent variables. 
For our first hypothesis, we construct a post-crisis dummy (POST-CRISIS) equal to one for 
all deals announced after the 2007–08 financial crisis; zero otherwise. 
During the months from late 2007 to early 2009, all stock markets across Europe crashed as 
a result of the credit crunch initiated in the USA. Moreover, economic indicators reacted to 
the financial crisis with a lag and it was only during the first quarter of 2009 that all European 
countries were officially in an economic recession (Claessens et al., 2010). Thus we start our 
POST-CRISIS dummy in March 2009, which coincides with the end of stock market crashes 
across Europe. 
In order to test our second hypothesis, we create a NON-EMU dummy, which equals one 
when the transaction happens across the EMU borders, that is, either the bidder or the 
target is located in a country outside the Eurozone. The idea is that these non-EMU 
acquisitions should provide greater diversification effects (along with potential foreign 
exchange risk) than acquisitions within the Eurozone, especially since the financial crisis and 
economic slowdown (Wan and Yiu, 2009). Thus we expect these non-EMU deals to earn 
significantly higher returns over the post-crisis period, and we test this hypothesis by 
calculating an interaction variable NON-EMU*POST-CRISIS. 
In order to assess the true impact of the variables mentioned above, we need to control for 
deal-specific and firm-specific characteristics. Deal-specific variables commonly used in the 
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M&A literature (Capron and Shen, 2007, Denis et al., 2002, Dos Santos et al., 2008, Gubbi 
et al., 2010, Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005, Shleifer and Vishny, 2003, von Eije and 
Wiegerinck, 2010, Blackburn et al., 1997, Brown and Ryngaert, 1991, Faccio and Masulis, 
2005, Martynova and Renneboog, 2008, Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006) are: the status of 
the target, that is whether it is privately held (PRIVATE=1) or not; the industry relatedness, 
that is whether the bidder and the target belong to the same industry (SAMEIND=1); the 
mode of payment (CASH=1); the relative size of the target (RELATIVESIZE=deal 
value/market value of the acquirer); and the percentage of target company acquired during 
the transaction (PERCACQ). Firm-specific characteristics such as acquirer’s size (MV) and 
price-to-book ratio (PTB) are also known to impact the short-term returns of the company 
(Lang et al., 1991, Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005, Rau and Vermaelen, 1998, 
Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006). 
Data 
Data on European acquisitions come from Thomson One. We collected all deals fulfilling the 
following criteria: (i) the acquisition was completed between 2004 and 2012; (ii) the bidder 
owned a majority stake in the target company after the transaction; (iii) the country of both 
bidder and target companies is an EU member at the beginning of the sample and at least 
one counterparty is located in a Eurozone country; (iv) the acquirer is publicly traded; and (v) 
the value of the transaction is available. From this initial sample, we deleted few deals (deal 
value equals zero, announcement date and effective date are more than 3 years apart) and 
matched the data with the list of stocks from Thomson DataStream (each stock must be 
actively traded around the announcement date).  
Our final sample consists of 2245 deals from 1088 bidders located in 20 different EU 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Republic of Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Table 1 shows the distribution of deals used in this 
study, by acquirer and target country. Note that Czech Republic and Hungary appear only as 
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target countries as there are no bidders from these countries present in our sample. The top 
five acquirer’s nations are France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and Spain; and these 
countries are also the most targeted by European acquirers. The six countries which are 
shaded in grey are non-EMU countries, thus all shaded deals are considered as non-EMU 
transactions (acquisitions from non-EMU to non-EMU countries are not included in our 
sample).  
[Table 1 about here] 
The deal characteristics we collected from Thomson One are: the deal value, the 
acquirer/target SIC code, the target status, the method of payment, and the percentage 
acquired during the transaction. Daily financial data on stock return, market value, and price-
to-book ratio of the acquirer are collected from Thomson DataStream. We also collected 
from DataStream daily market index returns and daily exchange rates of each EU currency 
with the USD. Table 2 presents the characteristics of stock markets in each country, that is, 
the number of stocks for which we collected daily returns, the stock market index used as a 
benchmark, and the currency of the returns. All returns and financial data were converted to 
USD. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Figure 1 presents various deal characteristics for the pre- and post-crisis periods across 
different categories of deals: domestic deals within the EMU, cross-border deals within the 
EMU and cross-border deals between EMU and non-EMU countries. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients across all our variables. Overall, most variables 
are not significantly correlated, the highest coefficient being 25 per cent correlation between 
PRIVATE and PERCACQ. 
[Table 3 about here] 
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RESULTS  
 
Univariate analysis of CAR 
Table 4 presents the results of the univariate analysis for CAR[-5;0]. CARs are averaged 
over two sub-periods, pre- and post-crisis, and Student tests are performed in order to 
compare the difference of CAR between the two periods. Across all deals (left side of the 
table), abnormal returns earned in the post-crisis period are significantly higher than 
abnormal returns earned before 2009. Deals announced after the crisis earned on average 
an extra 0.69 per cent return (equivalent to 2.5 per cent a month). This is a preliminary 
indication of a significant difference in the performance of acquisitions announced before 
versus after the financial crisis, which we sought to test in the first hypothesis. 
In the right side of the table, CARs are averaged across EMU and non-EMU transactions in 
order to further investigate these abnormal returns. We perform additional Student tests to 
compare abnormal returns between EMU and non-EMU deals. On one hand, the significant 
difference we found for all deals between the two periods is entirely due to significantly 
higher abnormal returns for non-EMU acquisitions in the second period. Indeed non-EMU 
transactions earn an extra 6 per cent monthly return when announced after the crisis; 
whereas there is no statistical difference between pre- and post-crisis EMU deals. On the 
other hand, testing for the statistical difference in CARs between EMU and non-EMU 
acquisitions reveals that non-EMU deals earn significantly higher returns (+5.4 per cent per 
month) than EMU deals, but only in the post-crisis period.  
In the middle part of the table, we also provide a distinction of average CARs between 
domestic and cross-border deals in order to highlight a potential cross-border effect 
previously emphasized in the literature (Gubbi et al., 2010, Moeller and Schlingemann, 
2005). Again we test for the statistical difference in CARs both between the pre- and post-
crisis periods and between cross-border and domestic acquisitions. Student tests of these 
differences are not all statistically significant. When comparing domestic and cross-border 
deals, we do not find any statistical difference in their CARs, both before and after the crisis. 
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Thus European acquisitions are not subject to the so-called cross-border effect. These 
results corroborate our hypothesis that, within the EU, the distinction between EMU and non-
EMU transactions is more relevant than the usual distinction between domestic and cross-
border acquisitions, especially in the post-crisis period. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Cross-sectional analysis 
Table 5 shows the results of OLS regressions with White robust standard errors. In Table 5 
model 1, we include only the control variables in the regression. Throughout the multivariate 
analysis, three of the control variables significantly impact the short-term abnormal return of 
the acquirer. MV has a negative impact, which is consistent with the managerial hubris 
hypothesis (Roll, 1986, Moeller et al., 2004, Faccio et al., 2006) whereas PERCACQ and 
RELATIVESIZE have a positive effect on CAR. Moreover, cash-financed acquisitions are 
usually associated with higher returns (Faccio and Masulis, 2005, Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008) as stock-financed transactions might signal to the investors that the stock 
is overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984). However our sample covers a long period of 
financial crisis and economic recession and thus is more concerned by undervalued than 
overvalued stocks. 
Our first hypothesis finds strong support in Table 5 model 2. Our POST-CRISIS dummy 
records a positive and significant coefficient (5 per cent statistical significance). The 
coefficient is 0.0072 indicating returns of 2.6 per cent per month which shows evidence that 
acquisitions announced during the economic recession earned higher abnormal returns 
compared to transactions announced over 2004–08. This result is consistent with the 
univariate analysis, that is European acquirers on average generate greater returns for their 
shareholders when undertaking M&A activities during the recessionary period, even after 
controlling for firm-specific and deal-specific characteristics. 
[Table 5 about here] 
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Table 5 model 3 presents the regression result with only the first dummy (NON-EMU). This 
variable alone doesn’t have much impact on the short-term return of the acquirer. However 
the analysis over the post-crisis period shows a different picture. Indeed the interaction term 
NON-EMU*POST-CRISIS clearly emphasize a significantly higher return for non-EMU deals 
after the crisis. We present several models with inclusion of different explanatory variables. 
The extra monthly return relative to pre-crisis non-EMU deals is between 4.5–6.0 per cent. It 
also means that during the economic recession in Europe, acquisitions across the Eurozone 
borders were better received by investors than intra-euro acquisitions. Overall, the cross-
sectional analysis is consistent with the univariate results in supporting our theoretical 
hypotheses. First, due to firm devaluation and low transaction costs as a consequence of the 
financial crisis, European acquirers benefited from the economic recession in their M&A 
activities and shareholders recognized these acquisitions as more value-generating, on 
average, than those announced before the crisis. Second, due to the existence of a 
monetary union in Europe, acquirers seeking to achieve higher returns through institutional 
and financial diversification need to target companies located in a country with a different 
currency regime. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study investigates the impact of the recent financial crisis on the short-term 
performance of European acquisitions. First, we question whether the financial crisis has 
had any impact on the announcement returns of bidding companies. We find that the 
acquirer’s short-term performance, measured by its abnormal stock return around the 
announcement date, is significantly higher in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis 
period. Second, we ask whether the membership of the Eurozone has been detrimental 
towards shareholder gains from European acquisitions during the recessionary period. Our 
results show that transactions involving non-EMU countries fare better than transactions 
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within the EMU. One reason for this could be that, after the crisis, for EMU deals, the 
synergies existing between the target and acquirer are unlikely to materialize due to 
uncertainty in the EMU region. Also, countries in the EMU have experienced tremendous 
monetary contractions as compared to other European countries like the UK. Membership of 
the same monetary union brings with it certain rules, regulations and inflexibility, and 
countries outside this union are unlikely to carry this baggage; hence the market could 
potentially reward the inherent flexibility and financial certainty of the non-Eurozone 
currencies. Overall, we show that, within the EU, the distinction between EMU and non-EMU 
transactions is more relevant than the commonly used classification of domestic and cross-
border deals, especially in the post-crisis period. 
Theoretical implications 
So far, most studies have focused on cross-border acquisitions (Campa and Hernando, 
2006) without looking at how the membership of monetary, political and economic alliances 
might impact returns materialized for acquirers and targets. Though regionalism has its 
advantages, as our study shows, in the short-term and in the recessionary, post-crisis 
period, this could be a disabling factor for companies choosing to invest in countries that are 
part of regional alliances; thus limiting the returns they can accrue for their investment 
activities. Most of the theory is built on regional alliances in stable economic and financial 
times (Hernando et al., 2009) and/or does not consider the impact of a financial crisis 
(Charumilind et al., 2006). Our paper shows that there is a great need to extend the current 
theory in terms of regional scope as well as engage with the temporal aspect of financial 
instability. Finally, our study highlights the importance of supranational institutions in Europe 
like the EMU which can shape the possible outcomes for cross-border investment activities. 
We argue that institutional theory needs to take into account how these supranational 
institutions might adapt and limit the target’s economic viability and acquirer’s strategic 
activities and possible financial returns from investments in mergers and acquisitions due to 
the company’s membership in certain monetary union. 
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Managerial implications 
Managers involved in acquisitions during the global economic recession are likely to derive 
higher returns from their investment than those acquisitions announced before the financial 
crisis. Though theory implies that acquirers can generate higher returns from acquisitions of 
low-priced high-value targets in foreign countries during recessionary times, our study 
presents a cautionary note. Managers need to take into account the regional monetary 
impact of the financial crisis which might prevent European companies from maximizing their 
returns from acquisitions.  
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Table 1 Number of deals by acquirer and target country 
   
Target country Total 
   
AU BE CY CZ DK ES FI FR DE GR HU IR IT LI LU NL PL PO SL SP SW UK 
 
A
c
q
u
ir
e
r 
c
o
u
n
tr
y
 
AU Austria 20     1       1 14     2 3     2 2   2 1 2 4 54 
BE Belgium   57 
 
    
  
29 3 
 
  1 5 
 
4 5   1 
 
4   9 118 
CY Cyprus   
 
9     
    
1   
     
  
   
  1 11 
CZ Czech Republic                                0 
DK Denmark             2 1 5       3     4       3     18 
ES Estonia   
  
    1 1 1 
  
  
     
  
   
    3 
FI Finland 1 
  
1 4 3 64 3 9 
 
  
 
2 1 
 
4 3 
  
1 22 5 123 
FR France 1 13 1 2 4 
 
2 271 35 6 2 1 24 
  
14 6 2 
 
22 4 25 435 
DE Germany 7 1 
 
2 4 
 
3 15 168 1 1 1 6 
 
2 15 1 
 
1 3 1 22 254 
GR Greece 1 
 
7     1 
  
1 65   
 
2 
   
1 
  
1     79 
HU Hungary                                    0 
IR Ireland 1 
  
  2 1 
 
1 3 
 
  24 
   
6   
   
2 28 68 
IT Italy 1 3 
 
    
  
8 12 
 
  1 209 
 
2 5 2 
  
9 1 14 267 
LI Lithuania   
  
    1 
    
  
  
7 
  
1 
   
    9 
LU Luxembourg   
  
    
    
1   
     
  
   
  1 2 
NL Netherlands 4 7 
 
1 1 
 
2 17 8 
 
1 1 4 
 
1 56 1 
  
5 10 21 140 
PL Poland 1             1    1 2 2 1       5     13 
PO Portugal   
  
    
   
1 
 
  
 
1 
   
  29 
 
4     35 
SL Slovenia   
  
    
    
1   
     
  
 
4 
 
    5 
SP Spain 2 2 
 
2   2 
 
10 6 2   
 
14 1 
  
3 5 
 
131 1 13 194 
SW Sweden 4 1      1 29 9 23     3 3 5  13     1 7     99 
UK United Kingdom 2 11 1       6 48 96 3   38 35   3 37   4 3 31     318 
  
Total 45 95 18 9 15 10 109 414 385 80 4 73 313 16 13 161 20 41 11 227 43 143 2245 
19 
 
Table 2 Acquirer’s country and stock market characteristics 
Bidder Nation 
EU year 
of entry 
Number of 
bidders Market index Currency 
     
Austria 1995 25 ATX EUR 
Belgium 1952 45 BEL20 EUR 
Cyprus 2004 10 FTSE Cyprus SE2O EUR 
Denmark 1973 11 OMX Copenhagen 20 DKK 
Estonia 2004 3 OMX Tallinn EUR 
Finland 1995 59 OMX Helsinki 25 EUR 
France 1952 187 CAC40 EUR 
Germany 1952 136 DAX30 EUR 
Greece 1981 51 ATHEX Composite EUR 
Ireland Rep. 1973 24 ISEQ EUR 
Italy 1952 110 FTSE MIB EUR 
Lithuania 2004 6 OMX Vilnius EUR 
Luxembourg 1952 1 Luxembourg SE General EUR 
Netherlands 1952 58 AEX EUR 
Poland 2004 10 TOTMKPO* PLN 
Portugal 1986 21 PSI20 EUR 
Slovenia 2004 3 TOTMKSJ* EUR 
Spain 1986 69 IBEX35 EUR 
Sweden 1995 59 OMX Stockholm 30 SEK 
UK 1973 200 FTSE 100 GBP 
     
* This is an index created by Thomson DataStream covering the total stock market 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix  
    CAR[-5;0]   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   
                          
  MEAN 0.011 
 
0.293 
 
0.504 
 
0.304 
 
387.1 
 
0.830 
 
0.273 
 
0.825 
 
2.692 
 
0.685 
 
0.395 
 
0.324   
  STD 0.059 
 
0.455 
 
0.500 
 
0.460 
 
2022.1 
 
1.986 
 
2.698 
 
0.293 
 
13.540 
 
0.464 
 
0.488 
 
0.466   
Correlation coefficients   
1 POST-CRISIS 0.053 ** 1.000 
                    
  
2 CROSS-BORDER -0.005 
 
-0.019 
 
1.000 
                  
  
3 NON-EMU 0.041 * -0.040 * 0.656 *** 1.000 
                
  
4 DEALVALUE -0.037 * -0.036 * 0.006 
 
-0.013 
 
1.000 
              
  
5 MV -0.074 *** 0.000 
 
0.059 *** -0.033 
 
0.228 *** 1.000 
            
  
6 RELATIVESIZE 0.063 *** -0.024 
 
-0.001 
 
0.022 
 
0.024 
 
-0.035 * 1.000 
          
  
7 PERCACQ 0.057 *** -0.011 
 
0.182 *** 0.213 *** -0.011 
 
-0.162 *** 0.035 * 1.000 
        
  
8 PTB 0.005 
 
-0.035 * 0.044 ** 0.025 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.002 
 
0.001 
 
1.000 
      
  
9 SAMEIND -0.013 
 
-0.056 *** 0.052 ** 0.046 ** 0.069 *** 0.045 ** 0.011 
 
-0.020 
 
0.005 
 
1.000 
    
  
10 PRIVATE 0.000 
 
-0.021 
 
0.069 *** 0.126 *** -0.122 *** -0.204 *** 0.003 
 
0.253 *** -0.002 
 
-0.016 
 
1.000 
  
  
11 CASH -0.009   0.104 *** 0.134 *** 0.180 *** 0.006   0.013   0.008   -0.034   0.007   -0.022   -0.043 ** 1.000   
21 
 
Table 4 Univariate analysis  
 
All deals   Domestic Cross-Border Difference   EMU non-EMU Difference  
          
Pre-crisis 0.91% 
 
0.98% 0.84% -0.14% 
 
0.85% 1.03% 0.18% 
 
 
1587 
 
778 809 
  
1086 501 
  Post-crisis 1.60% 
 
1.52% 1.68% 0.16% 
 
1.18% 2.68% 1.50% ** 
 
658 
 
336 322 
  
477 181 
  Difference 0.69% 
 
0.54% 0.84% 
  
0.33% 1.65% 
    **    *     **   
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Table 5 Cross-sectional regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
POST-CRISIS  0.00724**   0.00350  0.00392 
  (0.00281)   (0.00316)  (0.00332) 
NON-EMU   0.00450   0.000147 0.00139 
   (0.00291)   (0.00322) (0.00339) 
NON-EMU*POST-CRISIS    0.0165*** 0.0138*** 0.0164*** 0.0125** 
    (0.00472) (0.00530) (0.00524) (0.00618) 
CASH -0.00121 -0.00188 -0.00207 -0.00255 -0.00265 -0.00256 -0.00285 
 (0.00274) (0.00275) (0.00279) (0.00276) (0.00276) (0.00279) (0.00280) 
MV -0.00204*** -0.00204*** -0.00206*** -0.00202*** -0.00202*** -0.00202*** -0.00203*** 
 (0.000657) (0.000656) (0.000657) (0.000655) (0.000655) (0.000656) (0.000656) 
PERCACQ 0.0101** 0.0101** 0.00864* 0.00853* 0.00878* 0.00850* 0.00846* 
 (0.00452) (0.00451) (0.00461) (0.00453) (0.00453) (0.00460) (0.00460) 
PRIVATE -0.00347 -0.00332 -0.00378 -0.00335 -0.00330 -0.00336 -0.00339 
 (0.00275) (0.00274) (0.00275) (0.00274) (0.00274) (0.00275) (0.00275) 
PTB 0.00181 0.00267 0.00145 0.00167 0.00211 0.00166 0.00206 
 (0.00922) (0.00922) (0.00922) (0.00920) (0.00921) (0.00920) (0.00921) 
RELATIVESIZE 0.00127*** 0.00130*** 0.00126*** 0.00129*** 0.00130*** 0.00129*** 0.00130*** 
 (0.000463) (0.000463) (0.000463) (0.000462) (0.000462) (0.000462) (0.000462) 
SAMEIND -0.00139 -0.000981 -0.00161 -0.00136 -0.00116 -0.00136 -0.00121 
 (0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00274) (0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00275) 
Constant 0.00683 0.00455 0.00722 0.00710 0.00595 0.00711 0.00592 
 (0.00453) (0.00461) (0.00454) (0.00452) (0.00464) (0.00453) (0.00464) 
23 
 
Observations 2,151 2,151 2,151 2,151 2,151 2,151 2,151 
R-squared 0.012 0.015 0.013 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.018 
Adj. R-sq 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 
        
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Dependent variable = CAR[-5;0], White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors & covariance 
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Figure 1 Deal characteristics across two sub-periods (pre- and post-crisis) and for 
different categories of deals  
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